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This paper analyzes monotone comparative statics predictions in several
classes of stochastic optimization problems. The main results characterize neces-
sary and sufﬁcient conditions for comparative statics predictions to hold based on
properties of primitive functions, that is, utility functions and probability distri-
butions. The results apply when the primitives satisfy one of the following two
properties: (i) a single-crossing property, which arises in applications such as
portfolio investment problems and auctions, or (ii) log-supermodularity, which
arises in the analysis of demand functions, afﬁliated random variables, stochastic
orders, and orders over risk aversion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Samuelson, economists have studied and applied sys-
tematic tools for deriving comparative statics predictions. Re-
cently, the theory of comparative statics has received renewed
attention [Topkis 1978; Milgrom and Roberts 1990a, 1990b, 1994;
Milgrom and Shannon 1994; Vives 1990]. The new literature
provides general and widely applicable theorems about compara-
tive statics, and further, it emphasizes the robustness of conclu-
sions to changes in the speciﬁcation of models. The literature
shows that many of the robust comparative statics results that
arise in economic theory rely on three main properties: super-
modularity, log-supermodularity, and single-crossing properties.
1
This paper characterizes log-supermodularity and single-
crossing properties in stochastic problems, establishing necessary
* I am indebted to Paul Milgrom and John Roberts for their advice and
encouragement on my Ph.D. thesis, on which this paper is based. For helpful
discussions, I would like to thank Kyle Bagwell, Peter Diamond, Joshua Gans,
Edward Glaeser, Christian Gollier, Bengt Holmstrom, Ian Jewitt, Miles Kimball,
Jonathan Levin, Eric Maskin, Preston McAfee, Edward Schlee, Christina Shan-
non, Scott Stern, several anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the
Australian National University, Harvard/MIT Theory Workshop, Pennsylvania
State University, the University of Montreal, Yale University, the 1997 summer
meetings of the econometric society in Pasadena, and the 1997 summer meeting
of the NBER Asset Pricing group. Generous ﬁnancial support was provided by the
National Science Foundation (graduate fellowship and Grant SBR9631760),
the State Farm Companies Foundation, and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
1. A function on a product set is supermodular if increasing any one variable
increases the returns to increasing each of the other variables; for differentiable
functions this corresponds to nonnegative cross-partial derivatives between each
pair of variables. A positive function is log-supermodular if the log of that function
is supermodular.
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187and sufﬁcient conditions for comparative statics predictions.
2
More precisely, let u be an agent’s payoff function, let f be a
probability density function, and let the agent’s objective function
be given by U(x,u) 5* u(x,s)f(s,u)ds, where x represents a choice
vector and u represents an exogenous parameter. The compara-
tive statics question concerns conditions on primitives—the pay-
off function and probability density—under which the agent’s
optimal choice of x is nondecreasing in u.
We begin with families of problems where one of the primi-
tive functions is log-supermodular (abbreviated log-spm). For ex-
ample, an agent’s marginal utility u9(w 1 s) is log-spm in (w,s)i f
the utility function satisﬁes decreasing absolute risk aversion; a
parameterized demand function D(p;e) is log-spm if demand be-
comes less elastic as e increases; a set of random variables is
afﬁliated
3 if the joint density is log-spm; and a parameterized
density of a single random variable, f(s;u), is log-spm if the pa-
rameter shifts the distribution according to the monotone likeli-
hood ratio property.
Our ﬁrst result establishes that the agent’s choice of x is
nondecreasing in u for all utility functions u that are log-spm, if
and only if f is log-spm. One application considers a pricing game
between ﬁrms with private information about their marginal
costs; we provide conditions under which each ﬁrm’s price in-
creases in its marginal cost (and thus, a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium exists). More generally, we show that U is log-spm for
all u that are log-spm, if and only if f is log-spm. The character-
izations of log-spm are used to establish relationships between
several commonly used orders over distributions in investment
theory, as well as to show that decreasing absolute risk aversion
is preserved in the presence of independent or afﬁliated back-
ground risks.
Our second set of comparative statics theorems provides nec-
essary and sufﬁcient conditions for comparative statics predic-
tions in problems with a single random variable, where one of the
2. Vives [1990] and Athey [1998] study supermodularity in stochastic prob-
lems. Vives [1990] shows that supermodularity is preserved by integration. Athey
[1998] allows for payoff functions that satisfy properties which are preserved by
convex combinations (including supermodularity, monotonicity, and concavity).
Independently, Gollier and Kimball [1995a, 1995b] use convex analysis to analyze
comparative statics of investment problems. The properties studied in this paper
are not preserved by convex combinations, and so different techniques are used.
3. A set of random variables is afﬁliated if, for all nondecreasing transforma-
tions, each pair is positively correlated.
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other is log-spm.
4 The results are applied to portfolio and ﬁrm
investment problems.
5 We further show how the results change
when we impose additional structure (such as restrictions on risk
preferences).
Finally, we extend the analysis to problems of the form
* v(x,y,s)f(s,u) ds, where we characterize single crossing of the x-y
indifference curves; the results are applied to signaling games
and consumption-savings problems.
II. COMPARATIVE STATICS WITH LOG-SPM PRIMITIVES
This section considers problems where one or both of
the primitives, u and f, are assumed to be nonnegative and
log-spm.
A. The Comparative Statics Problem
We begin with some notation. Let Q # R, let X 5 X1 3 ...3
Xn (each Xi # R),
6 and let S 5 S1 3 ...3 Sm (each Si # R). Let
m be a nonnegative s-ﬁnite product measure on S, and let u : X 3
S 3 R and f : S 3Q3 R be bounded, measurable functions.
7
Deﬁne U : X 3Q3 R by U(x,u) [*u(x,s)f(s;u) dm(s).
In this context we seek conditions on u and f under which the
following monotone comparative statics prediction holds:
(MCS) x*~u,B! ; arg max
x[B
U~x,u!is nondecreasing in u and B.
In order to make (MCS) precise, we need to specify in what
sense x* should be nondecreasing, as well as what it means for
4. Karlin and Rubin [1956] study the preservation of single-crossing proper-
ties under integration with respect to log-spm densities. A number of papers in the
statistics literature have exploited this relationship, and Karlin’s [1968] mono-
graph presents the general theory of the preservation of an arbitrary number of
sign changes under integration. Jewitt [1987] exploits the work on the preserva-
tion of single-crossing properties and bivariate log-spm in his analysis of orderings
over risk aversion; he makes use of the fact that orderings over risk aversion can
be recast as statements about log-spm of a marginal utility.
5. Many authors have studied the comparative statics properties of portfolio
and investment problems, including Diamond and Stiglitz [1974], Eeckhoudt and
Gollier [1995], Gollier [1995], Hadar and Russell [1978], Jewitt [1986, 1987,
1988b, 1989], Kimball [1990, 1993], Landsberger and Meilijson [1990], Meyer and
Ormiston [1983, 1985, 1989], Ormiston [1992], and Ormiston and Schlee [1992,
1993]; see Scarsini [1994] for a survey.
6. Nothing would change in the paper if we let X be an arbitrary lattice; we
use X # R
n for simplicity.
7. More generally, whenever integrals appear, we assume that requirements
of integrability and measurability are met.
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notation from lattice theory. Given a set X and a partial order $,
the operations “meet” (~) and “join” (`) are deﬁned as follows:
x ~ y 5 inf {zuz $ x, z $ y} and x ` y 5 sup {zuz # x, z # y}. For
R
n with the usual order, these represent the component-wise
maximum and component-wise minimum, respectively. A lattice
is a set X together with a partial order, such that the set is closed
under meet and join.
These deﬁnitions can be used to deﬁne the order over sets
used in (MCS).
DEFINITION 1. A set A is greater than a set B in the strong set
order (SSO), written as A $ B, if, for any a [ A and any b [




is nondecreasing in the strong set order (SSO) if for any
tH .t L,A (tH) $ A(tL). A set A is a sublattice if A $ A.
If a set-valued function is nondecreasing in the strong set order,
then the lowest and highest elements of this set are nondecreas-
ing. To see an example, a set of the form [a1,b1] 3 [a2,b2]i s
nondecreasing (SSO) in ai and bi,i5 1,2.
We assume throughout that the constraint set B is a sublat-
tice, so that it is closed under the meet and join operations. Thus,
if one component of x increases, the constraint set does not force
other components of x to decrease. Then, Milgrom and Shannon
[1994] show that (MCS) holds if and only if U is quasi-supermodu-
lar (abbreviated quasi-spm) in x and satisﬁes a single crossing
property, referred to as SC2, in (x;u).
8 These properties are de-
ﬁned as follows.
DEFINITION 2. For T # R, let g : T 3 R. (i) g satisﬁes single
crossing (SC1) in t if there exists inf T # t9 0 # t0 0 # sup T such
that g(t) , (#) 0 for all t , (#) t9 0, g(t) 5 0 for all t9 0 , t , t0 0,
and g(t) . ($) 0 for all t . ($) t0 0.
(ii) h : X 3 T 3 R satisﬁes single crossing in two vari-
ables (SC2) in (x;T) if, for all xH . xL,g (t) [ h(xH;t) 2 h(xL;t)
satisﬁes SC1.
8. Since an empty set is always larger and smaller than any other set in the
strong set order, we do not state an assumption about the existence of an optimum
(following Milgrom and Shannon [1994]).
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(xi;xj) for all i Þ j.
9
The deﬁnition of SC1 simply says that as t increases, g(t) crosses
zero at most once and from below. Single crossing in two vari-
ables, SC2, in (x;t) requires that the incremental returns to x
satisfy SC1. When U satisﬁes SC2 in (x;u), as u increases, an
agent choosing between xL and xH will ﬁrst prefer xL, then
become indifferent, and ﬁnally prefer xH. For establishing (MCS),
the additional requirement that U is quasi-spm ensures that
increases in the components of x reinforce one another.
B. Log-Spm Primitives
To understand when primitive functions might be log-spm,
consider ﬁrst the formal deﬁnition.
10
DEFINITION 3. Let (X,$) be a lattice. A function h : X 3 Â is
supermodular if, for all x, y [ X, h(x ~ y) 1 h(x ` y) $
h(x) 1 h(y). h is log-supermodular (log-spm) if it is non-
negative, and, for all x,y [ X, h(x ~ y) z h(x ` y) $ h(x) z h(y).
To interpret this, observe that for a function h : R
2 3 R,
supermodularity requires that the incremental returns to in-
creasing x, deﬁned by g(t) [ h(xH;t) 2 h(xL;t), must be nonde-
creasing in t; log-supermodularity of a positive function requires
that the relative returns, h(xH;t)/h(xL;t), are nondecreasing in t.
The multivariate version of supermodularity simply requires that
the relationship just described holds for each pair of variables.
11
Topkis [1978] proves that if h is twice differentiable, h is super-
modular if and only if (]
2/]xi­xj)h(x) $ 0 for all i Þ j. If h is
positive, then h is log-spm if and only if log (h(x)) is supermodu-
lar. Both properties are stronger than quasi supermodularity;
thus, as properties of objective functions, both are sufﬁcient for
comparative statics predictions to hold. Observe that sums of
supermodular functions are supermodular, and products of log-
9. This deﬁnition applies because we assumed that X is a product set. When
X is an arbitrary lattice, h is quasi-supermodular if for all x,y [ X, h(x) 2 h(x `
y) $ (.) 0 implies h(x ~ y) 2 h(y) $ (.)0 .
10. Karlin and Rinott [1980] referred to log-spm as multivariate total posi-
tivity of order 2.
11. Although supermodularity can be checked pairwise (see Topkis [1978]),
Lorentz [1953] and Perlman and Olkin [1980] establish that the pairwise char-
acterization of log-spm requires additional assumptions, such as strict positivity
(at least throughout “order intervals”).
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are not necessarily log-spm.
Consider some examples where economic primitives are log-
spm. A parameterized demand function D(P;t) is log-spm if and
only if the price elasticity, e(P;t) [ P z DP(P;t)/D(P;t), is nonde-
creasing in t. A marginal utility function U9(w 1 s) is log-spm in
(w,s) (where w often represents initial wealth and s represents
the return to a risky asset) if and only if the utility satisﬁes
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). A parameterized dis-
tribution F(z;u) has a hazard rate f(s;u)/(1 2 F(s;u)) which is
nonincreasing in u if 1 2 F(s;u) is log-spm. Milgrom and Weber
[1982] show that a vector of random variables is afﬁliated if and
only if their joint density is log-spm (almost everywhere). When
the support of F( z ;u), denoted supp [F], is constant in u, and F has
a density f,
12 then the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Order (MLR)
requires that f is log-spm, that is, the likelihood ratio f(s;uH)/
f(s;uL) is nondecreasing in s for all uH . uL.
13
C. Necessary and Sufﬁcient Conditions for Comparative Statics
Our ﬁrst step in analyzing (MCS) for problems with log-spm
primitives follows.
LEMMA 1. Suppose that f is nonnegative. Then (i) (MCS) holds for
all u : X 3 S 3 R1 log-spm, if and only if (ii) U is log-spm in
(x,u) for all u : X 3 S 3 R1 log-spm.
Lemma 1 states that if we want (MCS) to hold for all log-spm
payoffs, the objective function U must be log-spm (a stronger
condition than quasi-spm). The proof shows that if U fails to be
log-spm in (x,u) for some u log-spm, then we can ﬁnd another
log-spm payoff v, for which (MCS) fails. Lemma 1 then motivates
the main technical question for this section: under what condi-
tions on f does log-supermodularity of u imply that U is log-spm?
Consider a result from the statistics literature, which will be one
of the main tools used in this paper.
LEMMA 2 [Ahlswede and Daykin 1979]. Let hi (i 5 1 ,...,4 )
represent four nonnegative functions, hi: S 3 R. Then con-
dition (L2.1) implies (L2.2):
12. The MLR can also be deﬁned for distributions with varying supports, or
distributions that do not have densities with respect to Lebesgue measure; see the
Appendix for details.
13. See Lehmann [1955] and Milgrom [1981]. Related, in the statistics liter-
ature [Karlin 1968], a strictly positive bivariate function satisﬁes total positivity
of order 2 (TP-2) if and only if it is log-spm.
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h1~s! z h2~s9! # h3~s ~ s9! z h4~s ` s9! for m-almost all s,s9 [ S.
(L2.2)
E h1~s! dm~s! zE h2~s! dm~s! #E h3~s! dm~s! zE h4~s! dm~s!.
Karlin and Rinott [1980] provide a simple proof of this lem-
ma.
14 They further explore a variety of interesting applications in
statistics, although they do not consider the problem of compara-
tive statics. While we will use this result in a variety of ways
throughout the paper, the most important (and immediate) con-
sequence of Lemma 2 for comparative statics is that log-super-
modularity is preserved by integration. To see this, set
h1~s! 5 g~y,s!, h2~s! 5 g~y9,s!, h3~s! 5 g~y ~ y9,s!,
and h4~s! 5 g~y ` y9,s!.
Then (L2.1) states exactly that g(y,s) is log-spm in (y,s), while
(L2.2) reduces to the conclusion is that * g(y,s) dm(s) is log-spm in
y. Recall that arbitrary sums of log-spm functions are not log-
spm, which makes this result somewhat surprising. But notice
that Lemma 2 does not apply to arbitrary sums, only to sums of
the form g(y,s
1) 1 g(y,s
2), when g is log-spm in all arguments.
The preservation of log-spm under integration is especially
useful for analyzing expected values of payoff functions. Since
arbitrary products of log-spm functions are log-spm, a sufﬁcient
condition for *u(x,s)f(s;u)dm(s) to be log-spm is that u and f are
log-spm. To understand the intuition, consider ﬁrst the case
where X,S # R. Then, u is log-spm implies that the relative
returns to x are nondecreasing in s. If f is log-spm, then u in-
creases the likelihood of high values of s relative to low values of
s. Then, Lemma 2 implies that u increases the expected relative
returns to x. In the multivariate case, log-spm of u and f ensure
that the interactions among components of x and s reinforce these
14. This result has a long history in statistics. Lehmann [1955] proves that
bivariate log-supermodularity is preserved by integration. Ahlswede and Daykin’s
[1979] result essentially extends the theory to multivariate functions. Karlin and
Rinott [1980] present the theory of multivariate total positivity of order 2 (MTP-2)
functions together with a variety of applications in statistics. Milgrom and Weber
[1982] independently derive a variety of properties of afﬁliated random variables
in auctions. See also Whitt [1982].
193 MONOTONE COMPARATIVE STATICSeffects. Karlin and Rinott [1980] give many examples of densities
that are log-spm, and thus preserve log-spm of a payoff func-
tion.
15 Below, in subsection II.D, we show how the result can be
used in analyzing the preservation of ratio orderings, such as
decreasing absolute risk aversion.
An especially important type of log-spm function for our
purposes is an indicator function for a sublattice or a nondecreas-
ing set-valued function.
LEMMA 3. Given A : R 3 2
S, the indicator function 1A(t)(s)i s
log-spm in (s,t) if and only if A(t) is a sublattice for each t,
and is nondecreasing (strong set order).
Lemma 3 implies, for example, that 1[a,b](s) is log-spm in
(a,b,s). To see how Lemma 3 can be used, observe that Lemmas 2
and 3 imply log-spm of a distribution is weaker than log-spm of a
density. Formally, if f(s;u) is log-spm (that is, the distribution
satisﬁes the MLR order), then the corresponding cumulative dis-
tribution function F(s;u) 5*1(2`,s](t)f(t;u) dt will be log-spm (that
is, it satisﬁes the Monotone Probability Ratio Order),
16 which can
be shown to be stronger than First Order Stochastic Dominance.
This in turn implies that *2`
a F(s;u) ds is log-spm, which is
stronger than Second Order Stochastic Dominance if u does not
change the mean of s.
In a similar way, Lemma 3 can also be used to show that
log-spm of f is a necessary condition for U to be log-spm whenever
u is log-spm. Lemma 3 helps us identify a set of “test functions”
that are a subset of the set of log-spm functions; these are the
functions used to create counterexamples. Consider the special
case where X 5 S. Deﬁne Be(x) 5 {y [ X : @i, yi [ [xi 2e , xi 1e ]}.
Because for each x and e, Be(x) is a sublattice and is nondecreas-
ing in x in the strong set order, Lemma 3 implies that 1Be(x)(s)i s
log-spm in (x,s). Deﬁne a set of such functions as follows:
T~ b ![$ u: ? 0 # e,bsuch that u~x,s![1Be~x!~s!%.
Then, for any b.0, U is log-spm in (x,u) whenever u [ T(b), if
15. For example, exchangeable, positively correlated normal vectors and
absolute values of normal random vectors have log-supermodular densities (but
arbitrary positively correlated normal random vectors do not; Karlin and Rinott
[1980] give restrictions on the covariance matrix which sufﬁce); and multivariate
logistic, F, and gamma distributions have log-supermodular densities.
16. See Eeckhoudt and Gollier [1995], who show that an MPR shift is sufﬁ-
cient for a risk-averse investor to increase his portfolio allocation.
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17 To see this, let m be
Lebesgue, and suppose that f is continuous. Then lime30
*1Be(x)(s)f(s;u) dm(s) 5 f(x;u). This formalizes what we mean by
a set of test functions: T(b) is a subset of log-spm functions, but
the set is large enough to make log-spm of f a necessary condition
for U to be log-spm.
18 The following result generalizes this
discussion.
LEMMA 4. Suppose that f is nonnegative, and that n $ 2i fm $ 2
(where m is the dimension of S and n is the dimension of X).
The following two conditions are equivalent: (i) U is log-spm
in (x,u) for all u: X 3 S 3 R1 that are log-spm a.e.-m; (ii) f is
log-spm in (s,u) a.e.-m.
REMARK. Lemma 4 requires that x has at least two components
(n $ 2) if s has two or more components (m $ 2).
19 However,
even in cases where m $ 2 and n 5 1, (ii) is sufﬁcient for (i),
and further, log-supermodularity of f in (si,u) for all i is
necessary for (i) to hold.
Lemma 4 is of interest in its own right, as we will see below.
For the moment, however, we use Lemma 4 (together with
Lemma 1) to prove our ﬁrst comparative statics theorem.
THEOREM 1 (Comparative Statics with Log-Supermodular Primi-
tives). Suppose that f is nonnegative, and suppose that n $ 2
if m $ 2 (where, again, m is the dimension of S and n is the
dimension of X). The following two conditions are equivalent:
(i) (MCS) holds for all u : X 3 S 3 R1 that are log-spm a.e.-m;
(ii) f is log-spm in (s,u) a.e.-m.
Theorem 1 gives necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for com-
parative statics when the payoff function is log-spm. Further, the
17. We say that f is log-spm a.e.-m if the inequality in Deﬁnition 3 holds for
almost all (with respect to the product measure on S 3 S induced by m)( s,s9) pairs
in S 3 S.
18. Our approach to necessity can be understood with reference to the sto-
chastic dominance literature, and more generally Athey [1998]. Athey [1998]
shows that in stochastic problems, if one wishes to establish that a property P
holds for U(x,u) for all u in a given class U, it is often necessary and sufﬁcient to
check that P holds for all u in the set of extreme points of U. The extreme points
can be thought of as test functions; for example, when U is the set of nondecreas-
ing functions, the set of test functions is the set of indicator functions for sets
1A(s) that are nondecreasing in s. Athey [1998] shows that this approach
works well when P is a property preserved by convex combinations, unlike
log-supermodularity.
19. If we extend the analysis so that X is an arbitrary lattice rather than a
product set, we require that X has at least two elements that are not ordered.
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ately check whether any additional restrictions on the class of
admissible payoff functions (where such restrictions might be
motivated by an economic model) affect the necessity conclusion.
For example, the elements of T(b) are clearly not monotonic, and
thus the “only if” part of Theorem 1 does not hold under the
additional assumption that u is nondecreasing. In contrast, we
can approximate the elements of T(b) with smooth functions, so
smoothness restrictions will not alter the conclusion of Theorem 1.
Finally, we observe that the results of Lemmas 2 and 3 can be
combined to provide sufﬁcient conditions for comparative statics
in problems outside the particular structure considered in (MCS).
For example, suppose that for j 5 1 ,...,J, A
j : R 3 2
S,A
j(tj)i s
a sublattice and is nondecreasing in tj, and let A(t) 5 ùj51,...,J
A
j(tj). Then if g and h are log-spm, x*(u,t,B) 5 arg maxx[B *s[A(t)
g(x,u,s)h(s;x,u) dm(s) is nondecreasing in all of its arguments.
20
D. Applications
The ﬁrst set of applications concerns risk aversion and back-
ground risks. Lemma 4 can be applied to problems that involve
orderings of ratios. For example, consider g, h: R 3 R1. Then,
deﬁne u : {0,1} 3 R 3 R1 by u(x,s) 5 g(s)i fx 5 1 and u(x,s) 5 h(s)
if x 5 0. Now observe that if h . 0, u is log-spm if and only if
g(s)/h(s) is nondecreasing in s. Using this construction, Lemma 4
implies that * g(s)f(s;u) ds/* h(s)f(s;u) ds is nondecreasing in u for
all g, h: R 3 R1 such that g(s)/h(s) is nondecreasing in s, if and
only if f is log-spm in (s;u).
The Arrow-Pratt coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion is de-
ﬁned in terms of a ratio. Let the coefﬁcient of risk aversion of the
utility function u evaluated at w be R(w;u[) [2 u0(w)/u9(w), and
let U(w;g,u) [* u(w 1 s;g)f(s;u)ds. Then, Lemma 4 has the fol-
lowing implication:
21
20. However, note that even if h is a probability density, the objective func-
tion in this problem cannot be interpreted as a conditional expectation of g, since
we have not divided by the probability that s [ A(t). The working paper [Athey
1996] uses Lemmas 2 and 3 to provide necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for
comparative statics predictions to hold when the objective function is a conditional
expectation.
21. Pratt [1988] ﬁrst established that risk aversion orderings are preserved
by expectations, while Jewitt [1987] ﬁrst showed that the “more risk averse”
ordering is preserved by a MLR shift. The results about prudence are new.
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R(w;u( z ;g)) is nonincreasing in w and f is log-spm in (s,u),
then R(w;U( z ;g,u)) is nonincreasing in u.
Following similar logic, Lemma 4 can be used to show
2. Preservation of Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion under
Background Risks. If R(w;u( z ;g)) is nonincreasing in w
and g, then R(w;U( z ;g,u)) is nonincreasing in w and g.
22
3. Prudence. Results (1) and (2) hold for a risk-averse agent
when R(w;u) is replaced by prudence [Kimball 1990], P(w;
u[) [2 u-(w)/u0(w), if u-.0 (or 2P, if u-,0).
Lemma 4 can also be used to analyze the average risk aversion of
a group of agents; suppose, for example, that a retirement fund
manager seeks to maximize the average utility of a group of
workers with heterogeneous portfolios (u) and risk preferences (g):
4. Populations of Agents. Consider a group of agents as
above. Let h(u,g;h) be the joint density of (u,g)i nt h e
population. Let U # (w;h) 5* *U(w;g,u)h(u,g;h) du dg be the
average expected utility for the population. If R(w;u( z ;g))
is nonincreasing in w and g, and f and h are log-spm, then
R(w;U # ( z ;h)) is nonincreasing in w and h. In words, if
higher (MLR) distributions of investment returns are af-
ﬁliated with lower risk aversion parameters, then the
average utility satisﬁes DARA, and an MLR shift in the
distribution of u or g decreases population risk aversion.
A second set of applications concerns log-spm games of in-
complete information. Consider a game of incomplete information
where each player has private information about her own type,
ti [ Ti # R, and chooses a strategy xi: Ti 3 Xi, where Xi # R.
Athey [2001] shows that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
(PSNE) in nondecreasing strategies exists in games of incomplete
information where an individual player’s strategy xi[ is nonde-
creasing in her type, whenever all of her opponents use nonde-
creasing strategies.
23
22. To see this, observe that u9(w 1 s;g) is log-spm in (w,s,g) if and only if
u0(w 1 s;g)/u9(w 1 s;g) is nondecreasing in w,s, and g, which is in turn equivalent
to requiring that R(w;u( z ;g)) is nonincreasing in w and g. This implies that u9(w 1
s;g)f(s) is log-spm in (w,s,g), and the result follows by Lemma 4.
23. This result requires that the type distribution is atomless (Lebesgue), and
that either X is ﬁnite, or X is compact and convex and payoffs have only certain
types of discontinuities. This result is distinct from results based on the theory of
supermodular games. For example, Vives [1990] analyzes games where increase
in an opponent’s strategy leads to a pointwise increase in a player’s best response.
This in turn implies that a PSNE exists. In contrast, if each player’s payoff vi(x)
is log-spm, the game does not necessarily have strategic complementarities, and
a different approach is required.
197 MONOTONE COMPARATIVE STATICSLet T 5 T1 3 ...3 TI, let h :T3 R1 be the joint density over
types (with respect to Lebesgue measure), assumed strictly posi-
tive on T, and let hi( z uti) be the conditional density of player i’s
opponents’ types. Let player i’s utility be given by vi : X 3 T 3 R.
Expected payoffs are Vi(xi,ti) [* t2i vi(xi,x2i(t2i),t)h2i(t2iuti) dt2i.
The following result gives necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for
each player’s best response to nondecreasing strategies to be
nondecreasing.
PROPOSITION 1. The following two conditions are equivalent: (i) for
all i, xi(ti) [ arg maxxi Vi(xi,ti) is nondecreasing in ti for all
xj[ nondecreasing for j Þ i, and all vi log-spm; (ii) the types
are afﬁliated.
Spulber [1995] analyzed how asymmetric information about
a ﬁrm’s cost parameters alters the results of a Bertrand pricing
model, showing that there exists an equilibrium where prices are
increasing in costs, and further ﬁrms price above marginal cost
and have positive expected proﬁts. Spulber’s model assumes that
costs are independently and identically distributed; Proposition 1
generalizes his result to asymmetric, afﬁliated signals, and to
imperfect substitutes. To see this, let vi(x,t) 5 (xi 2 ti)Di(x), where
x is the vector of prices, t is the vector of marginal costs, and Di(x)
gives demand to ﬁrm i when prices are x. First observe that xi 2
ti is log-spm. Then, by Lemma 4, the expected payoff function is
log-spm if the signals are afﬁliated, each opponent uses a non-
decreasing strategy, and Di(x) is log-spm. The interpretation of
the latter condition is that the elasticity of demand is a nonin-
creasing function of the other ﬁrms’ prices.
24 When the goods are




1x2~t2!.x1~t2! zz 1xn~tn!.x1~t2!h~t21ut1! dt21.
Since the set {tj : xj(tj) . x1} is nondecreasing (strong set order) in
x1 when each xi is nondecreasing by Lemma 3, expected payoffs
must be log-spm when the density h is log-spm.
24. Demand functions that satisfy these criteria include logit, CES, transcen-
dental logarithmic, and a set of linear demand functions (see Milgrom and Roberts
[1990b] and Topkis [1979]).
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This section studies single-crossing properties in problems
where there is a single real-valued random variable. Multivariate
generalizations of the results are sufﬁciently restrictive that they
are not considered here. However, many problems in the theory of
investment under uncertainty concern a single random variable,
and a number of other problems (such as auctions) can be refor-
mulated so that the techniques from this section apply.
Formally, in this section we assume that S # R, and for
simplicity we also assume that X # R. Then, we deﬁne U(x,u) [
* u(x,s)f(s;u) dm(s). Although the results of Section II apply to this
problem, in this section we seek to relax the assumption that both
primitives are log-spm. In particular, we consider the weaker
assumption that u(x,s) satisﬁes SC2 in (x;s). Our comparative
statics question becomes to ﬁnd conditions on u and f under which
(MCS9) x*~u,B! 5 arg max
x[B
U~x,u!is nondecreasing in u and B.
Theorem 1 gives some initial insight into this problem: since
the set of SC2 functions includes the set of log-spm functions,
Theorem 1 implies that a necessary condition for (MCS9) to hold
for all u which are SC2 is that f is log-spm. a.e.-m. However, we
have not established that u SC2 and f log-spm are sufﬁcient for
(MCS9), nor have we addressed the question of what conditions on
u are necessary for the conclusion that (MCS9) holds for all f
log-spm.
Before proceeding, we introduce a deﬁnition that will allow
us to state concisely the results in this section. The deﬁnition
helps to state theorems about pairs of hypotheses about u and f
which guarantee a monotone comparative statics conclusion.
DEFINITION 4. Two hypotheses H-A and H-B are a minimal pair of
sufﬁcient conditions (MPSC) for the conclusion C if (i) C holds
whenever H-B does, if and only if H-A holds. (ii) C holds
whenever H-A does, if and only if H-B holds.
This deﬁnition captures the idea that we are looking for a
pair of sufﬁcient conditions that cannot be weakened without
placing further structure on the problem. In some contexts, H-A
will be given (such as an assumption on u), and we will search for
the weakest hypothesis H-B (such as an assumption on f) that
preserves the conclusion; in other problems, the roles of H-A and
199 MONOTONE COMPARATIVE STATICSH-B will be reversed. The deﬁnition can be used to state this
section’s main comparative statics result.
THEOREM 2 (Comparative Statics with Single-Crossing Payoffs).
(A) u satisﬁes SC2 in (x;s) a.e.-m; and (B) f is log-spm a.e.-m;
are a MPSC for (C) (MSC9) holds.
25
Theorem 2 has an interesting interpretation. Recall that SC2
of u(x,s) (condition T2-A) is the necessary and sufﬁcient condition
for the choice of x which maximizes u(x,s) (under certainty) to be
nondecreasing in s. Thus, Theorem 2 gives necessary and sufﬁ-
cient conditions for the preservation of comparative statics re-
sults under uncertainty.
26 Any result that holds when s is known,
will hold when s is unknown but the distribution of s experiences
an MLR shift. Further, MLR shifts are the weakest distributional
shifts that guarantee that conclusion. In Section IV we illustrate
in applications how additional commonly encountered restric-
tions on u or f can be used to relax (T2-A) and (T2-B).
We outline the proof of Theorem 2 in the text. Our ﬁrst step
is to transform the problem by taking the ﬁrst difference with
respect to x. In particular, U(x,u) and u(x,s) satisfy SC2 (in (x;u)
and (x;s)) if and only if, for all xH . xL,U (xH,u) 2 U(xL,u) and
u(xH,s) 2 u(xL,s) satisfy SC1 (in u and s). The following lemma
characterizes SC1 for problems with a single random variable.
27
It is stated in more general notation because not only will we
apply it in cases where u is a payoff function and f is a probability
density, but also we will apply it to transformed objective func-
tions (where for example, f is a probability distribution) as well as
25. The quantiﬁcation over constraint sets B in (MCS9) can be dropped for the
result that (B) is necessary for (C) to hold whenever (A) does.
26. Jewitt [1987] and Ormiston and Schlee [1993] also give this interpreta-
tion in their analyses. Ormiston and Schlee explicitly analyze the preservation of
comparative statics with respect to MLR shifts, and further show, under addi-
tional regularity assumptions, that single crossing of u is a necessary condition for
the result to hold for all MLR shifts.
27. The theory of the preservation of single-crossing properties under uncer-
tainty has been studied by a number of authors in the statistics literature. Karlin
and Rubin [1956] establish sufﬁciency, and Karlin [1968, pp. 233–237] analyzes
necessary conditions, under some additional regularity conditions (including the
assumption that Q has at least three points; Karlin’s proof is designed to solve a
more complicated problem and thus requires an elaborate construction). In Ex-
tension (ii) to Lemma 5 below, we relax Karlin’s maintained assumptions about
absolute continuity. When K is a probability distribution, the maintained absolute
continuity assumption may be undesirable; however, if k represents a utility
function, it is the right assumption.
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bility distribution directly.
LEMMA 5. Let g : S 3 R and k : S 3Q3 R. (A) g satisﬁes SC1
a.e.-m;
28 and (B) k is log-spm a.e.-m; are a MPSC for (C) G(u) [
* g(s)k(s;u) dm(s) satisﬁes SC1.
Several extensions to Lemma 5 will be useful in our applica-
tions. To state them, we need another deﬁnition: we say that g :
R 3 R satisﬁes weak SC1 if there exists a t0 such that g(t) # 0 for
all t , t0 and g(t) $ 0 for all t . t0, while h : X 3 R 3 R satisﬁes
weak SC2 in (x;t) if, for all xH . xL,g (t) [ h(xH;t) 2 h(xL;t)
satisﬁes weak SC1.
EXTENSIONS TO LEMMA 5.
29 Lemma 5 also holds under any of the
following modiﬁcations: (i) g depends on u directly, under the
additional restrictions that g is piecewise continuous in u and
either (a) g is nondecreasing in u, or (b) for all u, g is nonzero
except at a single (ﬁxed) point s0, and further, for all uH .u L,
g(s,uH)/g(s,uL) is nondecreasing in s.
(ii) We allow that for each u, there exists a measure m
u
such that K(s;u) [* 2`
s k(t,u) dm
u(t), we deﬁne G(u) [*g(s)
dK(s;u), and we replace (B) with (B9) u orders K( z ;u) by MLR.
(iii) supp [K( z ;u)] is constant in u, and (A) is replaced
with (A9) g satisﬁes weak SC1.
Consider ﬁrst sufﬁciency. Intuitively, if g satisﬁes SC1 and
crosses zero at s0, then log-spm of k guarantees that as u in-
creases, the weight on s relative to s0 increases (decreases) for
values of s where g is nonnegative (nonpositive), i.e., where s .
(,) s0. More formally, suppose for simplicity that k . 0. Deﬁne
l(s) [ k(s;uH)/k(s;uL). (L5-B) implies that l[ is nondecreasing. In
turn, this implies that for every possible crossing point s0:
(1) l~s! # l~s0! for s , s0, while l~s! $ l~s0! for s . s0.
Condition (1) is then used to establish sufﬁciency, as follows.
Given uH .u L and a point s0 where g crosses zero,
28. We will say that g(s) satisﬁes SC1 almost everywhere-m (a.e.-m) if condi-
tions in the deﬁnition of SC1 hold for almost all (with respect to the product
measure on S 3 S induced by m)( sL,sH) pairs in S 3 S such that sL , sH.
29. A version of this theorem which gives minimal sufﬁcient conditions for
strict single crossing is provided in Athey [1996].
















5 l~s0!E g~s!k~s;uL! dm~s!.
The second equality holds because g satisﬁes SC1, while the
inequality follows from (1). If, in addition, l(s0) # 1, then * g(s)k(s;
uH) dm(s) # 0 implies that * g(s)k(s;uL) dm(s) # * g(s)k(s;uH) dm(s).
The necessity parts of this theorem can be proved by con-
structing counterexamples, which are drawn from an appropriate
set of test functions:
LEMMA 6 (Test Functions for Single-Crossing Problems). Deﬁne
the following sets:
G~ b ![$ g: ?a, b . 0, b.e , d.0, and sL , sH such that g~s!
52 a for s [ ~sL 2e , sL 1e ! , g~s!5b for s [
~sH 2e , sH 1e !ugu ,delsewhere, and g satisﬁes SC1%
K~ b ![$ k: ?a . 0 and h: Q 3 S, h increasing, and some
b.e.0 such that k~s,u! 5 a for s [ ~h~ u !2e ,
h~ u !1e ! , and k~s,u! 5 0 elsewhere%.
Then Lemma 5 holds if, for any b.0, (L5-A) is replaced with
(L5-A9) g [ G(b); Lemma 5 also holds if (L5-B) is replaced with
(L5-B9) k [ K(b).
As in Lemma 4, placing smoothness assumptions on g or k
will not change the conclusions of Lemmas 5 and 6, but monoto-
nicity or curvature assumptions will.
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(L5-A), then there is a positive measure of pairs sL , sH such that
g(sL) . 0, but g(sH) , 0. But then, k can be deﬁned so that k( z ;uH)
places all of the weight on high points near sH, while k( z ;uL)
places all of the weight on the low points near sL. This k is
log-spm, but G fails SC1.
If k fails (L5-B), then there exist two sets of positive measure,
SH and SL, such that increasing u places more weight on SL
relative to SH. Then we can construct a g(s) that is negative on SL,
positive on SH, and close to zero everywhere else as illustrated in
Figure I.
A. Applications in Investment and Portfolio Theory
The ﬁrst set of applications considers investment problems
where the agent chooses the probability distribution directly,
from a parameterized family of distributions. For example, the
agent chooses effort in a principal-agent problem, or makes an
investment decision. The exogenous parameter (u) describes risk
preferences. We seek a MPSC for the conclusion that investment
increases when risk preferences change. For this purpose,
Lemma 5 provides succinct proofs of some existing results, and
further suggests some new ones.
Let v : S 3Q3 R be an agent’s utility function, suppose that
S 5 [s I,s #] , R, and let H( z ;x) be a probability distribution on S,
parameterized by x, with density h( z ;x) with respect to m. The
agent solves maxx[B *S v(s,u)h(s;x) dm(s).
30 For simplicity, con-
sider the case where v is twice differentiable in s, and the deriva-



















The following result follows directly from these equations and
Lemma 5.
31
30. This is an example where it is useful to have results that do not rely on
concavity of the objective: concavity of the objective in x requires additional
assumptions (see Jewitt [1988a] and Athey [1998]), which may or may not be
reasonable in a given application.
31. Of these results, only (ii) has received attention in the literature. Dia-
203 MONOTONE COMPARATIVE STATICSPROPOSITION 2. Consider the following conclusion: (C) x*(u,B) 5
arg maxx[B *S v(s,u)h(s;x) dm(s) is nondecreasing in u and B.
In each of the following, (A) and (B) are a MPSC for (C):
This result provides necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for
comparative statics in a range of applications. Consider each of
(i)–(iii) in turn.
32 Case (i) might apply if a principal offers a
mechanism to an agent where the allocation that will be received
mond and Stiglitz [1974] established the sufﬁciency side of the relationship, and
many authors have since exploited and further studied the result (such as Jewitt
[1987, 1989]). Jewitt [1987] shows that (A) is necessary and sufﬁcient for (C) to
hold whenever (B) does.
32. In each of (i)–(iii), the fact that (B) is necessary for the conclusion to hold
whenever (A) holds relies crucially on the nonmonotonicity of the relevant func-
tion in (A). Thus, while the sufﬁcient conditions and the necessity of (A) in each
case are quite general, one should be more careful in drawing conclusions about
the necessity of (B).
FIGURE I
A Test Function for the Set of Single-Crossing Functions
Additional Assumptions: (A) (B)
(i) v $ 0, and {suv(s,u) Þ 0} is
constant in u.
v is log-spm. a.e.-m. h is weak SC2 in (x;s)
a.e.-m.
(ii) vs $ 0, and {suvs(s,u) Þ 0} is
constant in u.
vs is log-spm. in (s,2u) a.e.-
Lebesgue.
H is weak SC2 in (x;
s) a.e.-Lebesgue.
(iii) *s sf(s;x) ds is constant in x,
vss # 0, and {suvss(s,u) Þ 0}
is constant in u.
2vss(s,u) is log-spm. in (s,2u)
a.e.-Lebesgue.
*2`
s H(t;x) dt is WSC2
in (x;s)
a.e.-Lebesgue.
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33 The payoff u is log-spm when higher types have a
larger relative return to s. When the support of s is ﬁxed, weak
SC2 of a probability density is stronger than FOSD but weaker
than MLR. In (ii), hypothesis (A) requires that the agent’s Arrow-
Pratt risk aversion is nondecreasing in u. Further, (B) requires
H(s;xH) crosses H(s;xL) at most once, from below, as a function of
s. Under this assumption, it is possible that increasing x de-
creases the mean as well as the riskiness of the distribution; that
is, it might incorporate a mean-risk trade-off. In case (iii), the
agents are restricted to be risk averse. We see that x always
increases with an agent’s prudence (as deﬁned in subsection
III.A) if and only if *2`
s H(t;x) dt satisﬁes weak SC2 in (x;s).
The second set of applications considers two classic problems,
the portfolio investment problem and the decision problem of a
risk-averse ﬁrm. We generalize several comparative statics re-
sults previously established only for special functional forms.
Consider ﬁrst the standard portfolio problem, where an agent
with initial wealth w invests x in a risky asset with return s, and
invests the remainder (w 2 x) in a risk-free asset with return r.
Thus, the agent’s payoff can be written as u((w 2 x)r 1 sx). The
marginal returns to investment are given by *u9((w 2 x)r 1
sx)(s 2 r)f(s;u)dm(s). Notice that s 2 r satisﬁes single crossing, and
as long as the utility function is nondecreasing, we can apply
Lemma 5 to this problem. In this problem the crossing point is
ﬁxed at s 5 r for all choices of x: thus, in applying (2), we could
actually weaken the restriction that f is log-spm. In particular, we
could assume that the likelihood ratio, l(s), is less than l(r) for s ,
r, and greater than l(r) for s . r. On the other hand, if we wish to
obtain comparative statics results that hold for all risk-free rates,
r, then it will be necessary that l(s) is log-spm.
While the portfolio problem has been widely studied, far
fewer results have been obtained for more general investment
problems, where potentially risk-averse ﬁrms invest in a risky
project p(x,s), or make pricing or quantity decisions under uncer-
tainty about demand. Suppose that an agent’s objective is as
follows: maxx[B *u(p(x,s))f(s;u)dm(s), and the solution set is de-
noted x*(u,B). Thus, p represents a general return function which
depends on the investment amount, x, and the state of the world,
33. Such uncertainty might arise if the principal cannot observe the agent’s
choice perfectly, or if the principal must design an error-prone bureaucratic
system to carry out the regulation.
205 MONOTONE COMPARATIVE STATICSs. Notice that in this problem, the crossing point of px is not the
same for all x (as it will be in the portfolio problem).
When this objective function is differentiable, it sufﬁces to
check that the marginal returns to x, denoted *u9(p(x,s))
px(x,s)f(s;u)dm(s), satisfy SC1. The following result treats this
case, as well as cases where investment is a discrete choice, or the
agent’s risk preferences change with the exogenous parameter.
34
PROPOSITION 3. Consider the problem maxx[B *u(p(x,s))f(s;u)
dm(s). Assume that u(y,u) is increasing and differentiable
35 in
y, and p(x,s) is nondecreasing in s. Then, (A) p(x,s) satisﬁes
SC2 in (x;s) a.e.-m, and (B) u1(y,u)f(s;u) is log-spm in (s,y,u)
a.e.-m,
36 are a MPSC for the conclusion (C) x*(u,B) is nonde-
creasing in u and B.
Hypothesis (B) is satisﬁed if (i) u decreases the investor’s
absolute risk aversion, and (ii) u generates an MLR shift in F.
Thus, this result provides a generalization of two basic results in
the theory of investment under uncertainty, illustrating that
log-supermodularity links the seemingly unrelated conditions on
the distribution and the investor’s risk aversion.
IV. INCORPORATING ADDITIONAL STRUCTURE ON PRIMITIVES
Many economic primitives have more structure than a single-
crossing property. One particular kind of structure that arises in
auction games and investment problems is that the incremental
return function g(s) is quasi-concave in s. For example, in a
portfolio problem with r 5 0, the marginal returns to investment
are quasi-concave if the agent is risk averse and the coefﬁcient of
relative risk aversion is greater than 1.
34. This result generalizes the existing investment literature in several
ways. This literature typically considers the problem where the objective is dif-
ferentiable and strictly quasi-concave. Landsberger and Meilijson [1990] show
that the MLR is sufﬁcient for comparative statics in the portfolio problem, and
Ormiston and Schlee [1993] show that general comparative statics results are
preserved by the MLR. A few papers consider comparative statics when p(x,s) 5
h(x) z s, as in Sandmo’s [1971] classic model of a ﬁrm facing demand uncertainty.
Milgrom [1994] shows that comparative statics results derived for the portfolio
problem also hold for Sandmo’s model. Proposition 2 highlights the critical role
played by the assumption that p satisﬁes SC2, but not multiplicative separability,
extending the existing results to more general models of ﬁrm objectives.
35. Differentiability is not essential, but it simpliﬁes the proof.
36. If u is not everywhere differentiable in its ﬁrst argument, the correspond-
ing hypothesis can be stated as follows: [u(yH,u) 2 u(yL,u)] z f(s;u) is log-super-
modular in (yL,yH,u,s) for all yL , yH.
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ing the counterexamples of Lemma 5: the test function illustrated
in Figure I is clearly not quasi-concave. Theorem 2 can then be
extended, as follows.
THEOREM 3. For each u [ Q, let K( z ;u) be a probability distribu-
tion on S. Then (C) (MCS9) holds for all sets B whenever (A)
u satisﬁes SC2 in (x;s) a.e.-m.,
37 and for all xH . xL, u(xH,s) 2
u(xL,s) is weakly quasi-concave in s a.e.-m, if and only if (B) K
is log-supermodular.
By Lemma 2 (and recalling the discussion in Section II),
log-spm of K (corresponding to the Monotone Probability Ratio
Order) is weaker than log-spm of k (corresponding to MLR). To
understand the difference between the two orders, observe that
the Monotone Probability Ratio Order (MPR) requires that u
increases the weight on s relative to the aggregate of all states s9
, s, while the MLR requires that u increases the weight on s
relative to every individual state s9,s.
38 One consequence is that
the MPR is more robust to perturbations.
Necessity of (T3-B) can be established using the test func-
tions approach.
39
LEMMA 7 (Test Functions for Single-Crossing/Quasi-Concave
Problems). If we deﬁne
G~b! [ $g: ? a,b . 0, b.e , d.0, and s0 such that g~s!52 a
for s [ ~2`,s0#, g~s! 5 b for s [ ~s0,s0 1 e#
and g~s! 5 d for s [ ~s0,`#%,
37. We will say that g(s) satisﬁes SC1 almost everywhere-m (a.e.-m) if condi-
tions (a) and (b) of the deﬁnition of SC1 hold for almost all (with respect to the
product measure on R
2 induced by m)( sL,sH) pairs in R
2 such that sL , sH. The
deﬁnition of SC2 a.e.-m is deﬁned analogously.
38. Another way to describe the difference is that the MLR requires that a
distribution be ordered by First Order Stochastic Dominance conditional on every
two-point set, while the MPR requires a distribution to be ordered by First Order
Stochastic Dominance conditional on every interval (2`,s] (the latter result is
established in the working paper [Athey 1996]).
39. It turns out that quasi concavity of g is not necessary for the comparative
statics conclusion. This follows because, as a probability distribution, K is re-
stricted to be monotone. This restriction prevents us from constructing the req-
uisite counterexamples. It can, however, be established that g cannot be decreas-
ing and then increasing at the upper end of the support; more generally, any
violations of quasi concavity must not be too severe relative to the magnitude of
the function.
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with ~T3-A9! for all xH . xL,u (xH, z ) 2 u(xL, z ) 5 g[ [ G(b).
Figure II illustrates a test function from Lemma 7. The
expected value of such a function is approximately b z k(s0;u) 2 a z
K(s0;u), highlighting the role of monotonicity of k/K in u (i.e.,
log-spm of K).
Athey [2000] further explores how restrictions on risk pref-
erences affect the comparative statics of portfolio and investment
problems; here, we present an example from auction theory.
A. Application: Mineral Rights Auction with Asymmetries and
Risk Aversion
This section studies Milgrom and Weber’s [1982] model of a
mineral rights auction, generalized to allow for risk-averse,
asymmetric bidders whose utility functions are not necessarily
differentiable.
40 We focus on the case of two bidders. Suppose that
bidders 1 and 2 observe signals s1 and s2, respectively, where each
agent’s utility (written vi(bi,s1,s2)) satisﬁes
(3) vi~bi,s1,s2! is nondecreasing in ~2bi,s1,s2! and
supermodular in ~bi,sj!, j 5 1,2.
40. As in the pricing game studied in Section II, this is not a game with
strategic complementarities between players’ bidding functions, so Vives [1990]
may not be applied to establish existence of a PSNE.
FIGURE II
A Test Function for the Set of Single-Crossing, Quasi-Concave Functions
208 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSThe signals have a joint density h with respect to Lebesgue
measure, and the conditional distribution of s2i given si is written
as H2i( z usi), with density h2i( z usi). Condition (3) holds, for
example, if vi(bi,s1,s2) [*v ˆi(y 2 bi)g(yus1,s2) dy, where the “com-
mon value” y is afﬁliated with s1 and s2, g( z us1,s2) is the condi-
tional density of y, and v ˆi is nondecreasing and concave.
41
When player 2 uses the bidding function b2[, then the set of
best reply bids for player 1 given her signal (s1) can be written as
(assuming ties are broken randomly)







When bidder 2 plays a nondecreasing strategy, (3) implies
that bidder 1’s payoff function given a realization of s2 satisﬁes
weak SC2 in (b1;s2). Consider ﬁrst the case where player 2’s
strategy is strictly increasing. The returns to increasing the bid
from bL to bH are strictly negative for low values of s2, when the
opponent bids less than bL; the returns are increasing in s2 on the
region where raising the bid causes the player to win, where she
would have lost with bL; and the effect is zero for s2 so high that
even bH does not win. Thus, the incremental returns to the bid are
quasi-concave as well as weak single crossing. When ties are
permitted, the single-crossing property remains, but quasi con-
cavity fails.
Observe further that the payoff function depends directly on
s1 as well. By assumption, the returns to b1 are increasing in s1.
This yields (using Extension (i) to Lemma 5, and Theorem 3).
PROPOSITION 4. Consider the two-bidder mineral rights model,
where the utility function satisﬁes (3) above, and the support
of the random variables is a product set. (i) Suppose that
bidder 2 uses a strategy b2[ which is nondecreasing in s2.
Then if the types are afﬁliated, b* 1[ is nondecreasing in s1.
(ii) Suppose that bidder 2 uses a strategy b2[ which is
41. To see why (3) holds, note that si and sj each induce a ﬁrst-order stochas-
tic dominance shift on F, and u ˆi is supermodular in (bi,v). Supermodularity of the
expectation in (bi,si) and (bi,sj) follows (see Athey [1998]).
209 MONOTONE COMPARATIVE STATICSstrictly increasing in s2. Then if H2(s2us1) is log-spm in (s1,s2),
b* 1[ is nondecreasing in s1.
Athey [2001] applies this result to show that in auction games
such as the ﬁrst price auction described above, a PSNE exists.
42
V. SINGLE CROSSING OF INDIFFERENCE CURVES
The Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing property (SM) is central
to the analysis of monotonicity in standard signaling and screen-
ing games, as well as many other mechanism design problems.
For an arbitrary differentiable function h: R
3 3 R that satisﬁes





]y h~x,y,t!U is nondecreasing in t.
When the (x,y) indifference curves are well deﬁned, (SM) is
equivalent to the requirement that the indifference curves cross
at most once as a function of t. We will make use of the following
assumption which guarantees that the (x,y)-indifference curves
are well-behaved:
43
(WB) h is differentiable in (x,y);
]
]y h(x,y,t)Þ0;
the ~x,y!-indifference curves are closed curves.
The following result characterizes (SM) for objective functions of
the form, V(x,y,u) [*v(x,y,s)f(s;u) dm(s).
LEMMA 8. Let v : R
3 3 R and f : R
2 3 R1, and suppose that v and V
satisfy (WB). Then (A) v(x,y,s) satisﬁes (SM) a.e.-m, and (B) f is
log-spm in (s;u) a.e.-m, are a MPSC for (C) V(x,y,u) satisﬁes (SM).
42. What happens when we try to extend this model to I $ 2 bidders? If the
bidders face a symmetric distribution, and all opponents use the same symmetric
bidding function, then only the maximum signal of all of the opponents will be
relevant to bidder 1. Deﬁne sM 5 max (s2,...,s1). Milgrom and Weber [1982]
show that (s1,sM) are afﬁliated when the distribution is exchangeable. Further, if
the opponents are using the same strategies, whichever opponent has the highest
signal will necessarily have the highest bid. Then we can apply Proposition 4 to
this problem exactly as if there were only two bidders. Unfortunately, this ap-
proach does not extend directly to n-bidder, asymmetric auctions with common
value elements. Under asymmetric distributions (or if players use asymmetric
strategies), afﬁliation of the signals is not sufﬁcient to guarantee that the signal
of the highest bidder is afﬁliated with a given player’s signal, nor is it sufﬁcient to
guarantee log-supermodularity of the conditional distribution.
43. It is also possible to generalize SM to the case where h is not differen-
tiable, but we maintain (WB) for simplicity.
210 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSTHEOREM 4 (Comparative Statics and the Spence-Mirrlees SCP).
Lemma 8 also holds if (L8-C) is replaced with (C) x*(u,B) 5
arg maxx[B V(x,b(x),u) is nondecreasing in u and B for all b :
R 3 R.
Sufﬁciency in Lemma 8 can be shown using Lemma 2. Let:
h1(s) 5 uvy(x,y,s)uf(s;uL), h2(s) 5 vx(x,y,s)f(s;uH), h3(s) 5 vx(x,y,s)f(s;
uH), h4(s) 5 uvy(x,y,s)uf(s;uL), and note that (T5-A) and (T5-B) imply


















A. Applications to Signaling Games and Savings Problems
Theorem 4 can be applied to an education signaling model,
where x represents a worker’s choice of education, y is monetary
income, and u is a noisy signal of the worker’s ability, s (for
example, the workers’ experience in previous schooling). If the
worker’s preferences u(x,y,s) satisfy (SM) and higher signals in-
crease the likelihood of high ability, the worker’s education choice
will be nondecreasing in the signal u for any wage function w(x).
In another example, consider a consumption-savings prob-
lem. Let x denote savings and b[ the value function of savings.
The agent has an endowment (u) of a risky asset (s). The proba-
bility distribution over asset returns is given by F( z ;u). The
agent’s utility given a realization of s is u(z 1 s 2 x,b(x)), which is
assumed to be nondecreasing. The agent solves maxx [ [0,z]
* u(z 1 s 2 x,b(x)) dF(s;u). The following two conditions are a
minimal pair of sufﬁcient conditions for the conclusion that sav-
ings increases in u: (A) the marginal rate of substitution of cur-
rent for future utility, u1/u2, is nondecreasing in s, and (B) F
satisﬁes MLR.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies conditions for comparative statics predic-
tions in stochastic problems, and shows how they apply to eco-
nomic problems. The main theorems are summarized in Table I.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































212 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSThe properties of primitives considered in this paper, the various
single-crossing properties and log-supermodularity, are each nec-
essary and sufﬁcient for comparative statics in an appropriately
deﬁned class of problems. Several variations of these results are
analyzed, each of which exploits additional structure that can
arise in economic problems. Because the properties studied in
this paper, and the corresponding comparative statics predic-
tions, do not rely on differentiability or concavity, the results from
this paper can be applied in a wider variety of economic contexts
than similar results from the existing literature.
This paper builds on results from the statistics literature to
establish sufﬁcient conditions for comparative statics. We further
provide new results about necessity, while highlighting the lim-
itations of these results. Table I summarizes the trade-offs that
must occur between weakening and strengthening assumptions
about various components of economic models. Together with
Athey [1998]’s analysis of stochastic supermodularity, concavity,
and other differential properties, the results in this paper can be
used to identify which assumptions are the appropriate ones to
guarantee robust monotone comparative statics predictions in a
wide variety of stochastic problems in economics.
APPENDIX
DEFINITION A1. For each u, let F( z ;u): S 3 R1 be nondecreasing
and right-continuous. For all uH . uL, let C
LH[ 5 1⁄2[F( z ;uH)
1F(z;uL)], and deﬁne f




LH(t). The parameter u indexes F( z ;u)
according to the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Order (MLR) if, for
all uH . uL,f
LH is log-spm a.e.-m.
44
Proof of Lemma 1. If U is log-spm in (x,u), then it must be
quasi-spm, which Milgrom and Shannon [1994] show implies the
comparative statics conclusion. Now suppose that U fails to be
log-spm in (x,u) for some u. For simplicity, consider the case
where n 5 2, and start with the case where U . 0. Then, there
exists an x1H . x1L,x 2H $ x2L and uH $ uL, with one of the weak
44. This deﬁnition is equivalent to the standard one, except that the deﬁni-
tion is more inclusive, in that absolute continuity of F( z ;uH) with respect to F( z ;uL)
on the intersection of their supports is a consequence of the deﬁnition, not
prerequisite for comparability.
213 MONOTONE COMPARATIVE STATICSinequalities holding strictly, such that U(x1H,x2H,uH)/U(x1L,x2H,uH)
, U(x1H,x2L,uL)/U(x1L,x2L,uL). Let g5U(x1L,x2L,uL)/
U(x1H,x2L,uL) . 0. Then, deﬁne b : X1 3 R by b(x1) 5 1i fx1 Þ x1H,
and b(x1H) 5g . Since log-spm is preserved by multiplication,
v(x,s) [ u(x,s) z b(x1) is log-spm in (x,s). Deﬁne V(x,u) [
*v(x,s)f(s;u)dm(s). But then, V(x1H,x2H,uH)/V(x1L,x2H,uH) 5
gU(x1H,x2H,uH)/U(x1L,x2H,uH) , 1 5g U(x1H,x2L,uL)/U(x1L,x2L,uL) 5
V(x1H,x2L,uL)/V(x1L,x2L,uL). Thus, V(x1H,x2L,uL) 5 V(x1L,x2L,uL)
while V(x1H,x2H,uH) , V(x1L,x2H,uH), violating the requirement
that (a) V is quasi-spm in x and (b) V satisﬁes SC2 in (x;u).
Now, return to the case where we might have U(x,u) 5 0 for
some (x,u). Note that since U $ 0, log-spm of U can fail in the
example above only if U(x1H,x2L,uL) . 0 and U(x1L,x2H,uH) . 0. If,
in addition, U(x1L,x2L,uL) . 0, the argument above is unchanged.
Now suppose that U(x1L,x2L,uL) 5 0. If U(x1H,x2H,uH) 5 0, then
quasi supermodularity fails as well; if U(x1H,x2H,uH) . 0, then
deﬁne v as above except with g5U(x1L,x2H,uH)/U(x1H,x2H,uH).
Then, we have V(x1H,x2L,uL) . V(x1L,x2L,uL) 5 0 while
V(x1H,x2H,uH) 5 V(x1L,x2H,uH), another violation of Milgrom and
Shannon’s [1994] necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for compara-
tive statics.
Proof of Lemma 4. Sufﬁciency follows from Lemma 2. Neces-
sity is treated in two main cases, with other cases following in a
similar manner:
(1) n,m 5 1: Deﬁne v(Auu) [* A f(s;u) dm(s). Pick any two
intervals of length e, SH(e) and SL(e), such that SH(e) $ SL(e) and
SH(e) ù SL(e) 5 A. Deﬁne u:{ xL, xH} 3 S 3 R by u(xL,s) [ 1SL(e)(s),
and let u(xH,s) [ 1SH(e)(s). Then * u(xL,s)f(s,u) dm(s) 5 v(SLuu) and
*u(xH,s)f(s;u) dm(s) 5 v(SHuu). Since u is log-spm, then * u(x,s)f(s;u)
dm(s) must be log-spm by (C), i.e., v(SH,uH)v(SL,uL) $
v(SH,uL)v(SL,uH). Taking the limit as e 3 0, standard limiting
arguments (e.g., Martingale convergence theorem) imply that f
must be log-spm in (s,u) almost everywhere-m.
(2) n,m $ 2: Deﬁne v(Auu) 5* A f(s;u) dm(s). We partition R
m
into m-cubes with element i given by [i1 2 1/2
t, i1 1 1/2
t] 3 ...3
[im 2 1/2
t, im 1 1/2
t], and let Q
t(s) be the unique cube containing
s. Consider a t, and take any a,b [ R
m. Further, let C 5 {y,z,y ~
z,y ` z}, where each element of C is distinct. Deﬁne u(x,s)o nC as
follows: u(y,s) 5 1Q
t(a)(s), u(z,s) 5 1Q
t(b)(s), u(y ~ z,s) 5 1Q
t(a~b)(s),
and u(y ` z,s) 5 1Q
t(a`b)(s). Let u(x,s) 5 0 for x ¸ C. It is
214 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSstraightforward to verify that u is log-spm. If *u(x,s)f(s;u) dm(s)i s
log-spm, it follows that v(Q
t(a ~ b)uu ~ u9) z v(Q
t(a ` b)uu ~ u9) $
v(Q
t(a)uu) z v(Q
t(b)uu9) for all u,u9. Since this must hold for all t and
for all a,b, we can use the Martingale convergence theorem to
conclude that f(a ~ b;u ~ u9) z f(a ` b;u ` u9) $ f(a;u) z f(b;u9) for
m-almost all a,b (recalling that m is a product measure).
Proof of Proposition 1. Sufﬁciency follows from Lemma 2 and
Milgrom and Shannon [1994]. Following the proof of Theorem 1,
it is possible to show that Ui(xi,ti) is log-supermodular for all
ui(xi,t) log-supermodular, only if, for all t2i
H . t2i











L). But, since for a positive
function, log-spm can be checked pairwise, this condition holds
for all i if and only if h is log-spm. Apply Lemma 1.
LEMMA A1. Let K(s;u) [* 2`
s k(t;u) dm(t). G(u) 5* g(6;u)k(s;u) dm(s)
satisﬁes SC1 in u under the following sufﬁcient conditions:
(i)(a) For each u, g satisﬁes WSC1 in s a.e.-m; for m-almost all
s, g is nondecreasing in u. (i)(b) k is log-spm in (s,u) a.e.-m.
(i)(c) Either g satisﬁes SC1 in s a.e.-m, or else supp [K( z ;u)] is
constant in u.
Proof of Lemma A1. Pick uH . uL. Suppose that * g(s;uL)k(s;
uL) dm(s) $ (.) 0. Choose s0 so that g(s,uL) $ 0 for m-almost all s .
s0 and g(s,uL) # 0 for m-almost all s # s0 (s0 exists by the deﬁnition
of WSC1). Let s ˆ0 5 min {s $ s0 and s [ supp [K( z ;uL)]}. First, a
fact that we will use repeatedly: if k is log-spm, then supp [K( z ;u)]
is increasing in the strong set order. Now, observe that if s ˆ0 ¸
supp [K( z ;uH)], then supp [K( z ;uH)] . s ˆ0 since supp [K( z ;u)] is
nondecreasing in the strong set order. This in turn implies that,
for all s in supp [K( z ;uH)], g(s,uH) $ g(s,uL) $ 0, which implies that
G(uH) $ 0. Further, if G(uL) . 0, then we can conclude that
G(uH) . 0 by (i)(c). Second, observe that the case where supp
[K( z ;uH)] # s ˆ0 is degenerate, since this would imply by the strong
set order that supp [K( z ;uL)] # s ˆ0 as well. But then our hypothesis
that G(uL) is nonnegative would imply that g(s,uL) 5 0 a.e.-m on
supp [K( z ;uL)]. Since supp [K( z ;u)] is nondecreasing in the strong
set order, this in turn implies that G(uH) 5 0 by (i)(c).
So, we consider the third case where s ˆ0 [ supp [K( z ;uH)],
but there exist s9,s0 [ supp [K( z ;uH)] such that s9,s ˆ0 , s0.
Notice that, by the strong set order, supp [K( z ;uH)] 5 supp
[K( z ;uL)] on an interval surrounding s ˆ0 unless s ˆ0 $ supp
[K( z ;uL)], a trivial case. It further implies that g(s,uL) # 0 for
215 MONOTONE COMPARATIVE STATICSall s [ supp [K( z ;uL)]\supp [K( z ;uH)] (because everything in the
set lies below supp [K( z ;uH)], which contains s ˆ0). By the same
reasoning, g(s,uL) $ 0o ns u p p[ K( z ;uH)]\supp [K( z ;uL)].
Now, deﬁne a modiﬁed likelihood ratio l ˆ(s), as follows:
l ˆ(s) 5 0 for s [ / supp [K( z ;uL)], l ˆ(s) 5 k(s;uH)/k(s;uL) for s [ supp
[K( z ;uL)] and k(s;uL) . 0, and then extend the function so that
l ˆ(s) 5 max (lims92s l ˆ(s9), lims91s l ˆ(s9)) for s [ supp [K( z ;uL)] and
k(s;uL) 5 0 (recalling that the likelihood ratio can be assumed
to be nondecreasing in s on supp [K( z ;uL)] without loss of
generality by (i)(b)). Thus, we know l ˆ(s ˆ0) . 0, since s ˆ0 [ supp
[K( z ;uL)] and since supp [K( z ;uH)] 5 supp [K( z ;uL)] on an open
interval surrounding s ˆ0. We use this to establish
E g~s;uH!k~s;uH! dm~s! $E g~s;uL!k~s;uH! dm~s!









5 l~s ˆ0!E g~s;uL!k~s;uL! dm~s!.
The ﬁrst inequality follows by the fact that g(s,uH) $ g(s,uL).
The second inequality follows by the deﬁnition of l ˆ(s) and since
g(s,uL) $ 0 on supp [K( z ;uH)]\supp [K( z ;uL)]. The third inequality
is true by WSC1 of g and because l ˆ(s) is nondecreasing a.e.-m on
supp [K( z ;uL)] since k is log-spm. The last equality is deﬁnitional.
Thus, since l ˆ(s) . 0, G(uL) $ (.) 0 implies G(uH) $ (.)0 .
LEMMA A2. If *g(s)dK(s;u) satisﬁes SC1 whenever g satisﬁes
SC1, then (i) supp [K( z ;u)] is nondecreasing in the strong
set order, and (ii) for all uH . uL,K ( z ;uH) is absolutely
216 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICScontinuous with respect to K( z ;uL)o n( i n f s supp [K( z ;uH)],
sups supp [K( z ;uL)]).
Proof of Lemma A2. Pick uH . uL. Deﬁne measures vL and vH
as follows. vL(A) 5* A dK(s;uL) and vH(A) 5* A dK(s;uH). Deﬁne
a 5 inf {sus [ supp [K( z ;uH)]} and b 5 sup {sus [ supp [K( z ;uL)]}.
Let C( z ;uH,uL) 5 1⁄2[K( z ;uL) 1 K( z ;uH)], and deﬁne h(s;u) [
dK(s;uH)/dC(s;uH,uL). Let D [ supp [K( z ;uL)] ø supp [K( z ;uH)].
Since the behavior of h(s;u) outside of D will not matter, we will
restrict attention to D. The proof proceeds in several steps.
Part (a). If a $ b, then the conclusions hold automatically.
Throughout the rest of the proof, we treat the case where a , b.
Part (b). For any S [ (sL,sH] , [a,b], vL(S) . 0 implies that
vH(S) . 0. Proof. Suppose that vL(S) . 0 and vH(S) 5 0. Note that
0 , K(sL;uH) since a , sL. If supp [K( z ;uH)] # sL, then deﬁne g as
follows: g(s) 52 1 for s [ (2`,sL), while g(s) 5 K(sL;uL)/vL([sL,`))
for s [ [sL,`). Otherwise, deﬁne g as follows: g(s) 52 1 for s [
(2`,sL), g(s) 5 K(sL;uL)/vL(S) for s [ S, and g(s) 5 .9 z K(sL;uH)/
vH([sH,`)) for s [ [sH,`). Now, it is straightforward to verify that
SC1 is violated for this g.
Part (c). For any S [ (sL,sH] , [a,b], vH(S) . 0 implies that
vL(S) . 0. Proof. Suppose that vH(S) . 0 and vL(S) 5 0. If
K(sL;uL) 5 0, then deﬁne g as follows: g(s) 52 1 for s [ (2`,sH),
while g(s) 5 K(sH;uH)/(2vH([sH,`)) for s [ [sH,`). Otherwise, deﬁne
g as follows. g(s) 52 vL([sH,`))/K(sL;uL) for s [ (2`,sL), g(s) 5
2vH([sH,`))/vH(S) for s [ S, and g(s) 5 1 for s [ [sH,`). Now, it is
straightforward to verify that SC1 is violated for this g.
Part (d). supp [K( z ;uH)] $ supp [K( z ;uL)] in the strong set
order. Proof. Parts (c) and (d) imply that vH is absolutely continu-
ous with respect to vL on [a,b], and vice versa. It now sufﬁces to
show that if s9 [ supp [K( z ;uH)] and s0 [ supp [K( z ;uL)], and s0
. s9, then s9,s0 [ supp [K( z ;uL)] ù supp [K( z ;uH)]. Since s ¸ supp
[K( z ;uL)] for all s . b, we may restrict attention to s0 # b.
Likewise we may restrict attention to s9.a. But, if (as we argued
in part (b)) vH is absolutely continuous with respect to vL and vice
versa on [a,b], then supp [K( z ;uH)] 5 supp [K( z ;uL)] on [a,b], and
we are done.
Proof of Lemmas 5 and 6. Sufﬁciency follows from Lemma
A1. Necessity will follow by constructing counterexamples from
the relevant sets. Necessity of (L5-A) follows by observing that for
217 MONOTONE COMPARATIVE STATICSany sL , sH, if we let SL(e) 5 (sL 2e ,sL] and SH(e) 5 (sH 2e ,sH],
the function k deﬁned by k(s;uL) [ 1SL(e)(s), k(s;uH) [ 1SH(e)(s)i s
log-spm. Thus, (L5-C) will imply that g is SC1 a.e.-m. Necessity of
(L5-B): pick uH . uL, and deﬁne vL,vH,a,b,h, and D as in the proof
of Lemma A2. It sufﬁces to consider log-spm of h. Note that
Lemma A2 implies that vH is absolutely continuous with respect
to vL and that supp [K( z ;uH)] $ supp [K( z ;uL)] in the strong set
order.
First, notice that if a $ b, then h is log-spm in (s;u) a.e.-m.T o
see this, observe that a $ b implies that h(s,uH) 5 0 and h(s,uL) 5
2 for s on supp [K( z ;uL)], while h(s,uL) 5 0 and h(s,uH) 5 2 on supp
[K( z ;uH)]. This implies that h(s;u) is log-spm.
Now, suppose that a , b. Let B 5 supp [K( z ;uL)] ù supp
[K( z ;uH)], which we have shown is equivalent to D ù [a,b]. Pick
any sL,sH [ B, and deﬁne SL(e) 5 (sL 2e ,sL] and SH(e) 5 (sH 2
e,sH], such that sH 2e$ sL. For the moment, we will suppress the
e in our notation. Suppose further that sL,sH [ B, but vH(SH) z
vL(SL) , vH(SL) z vL(SH). By deﬁnition, if sL . a, then vH([a,sL 2
e]) . 0; then, by absolute continuity, vL([a,sL 2e ]) . 0, and thus





s [ ~2`,sL 2 e!
21 s [ SL
H




It is straightforward to verify that there exists a d.0 such
that the single-crossing property fails with this g. But this implies
that for any e positive and in the relevant range, vH(SH(e)) z
vL(SL(e)) $ vH(SL(e)) z vL(SH(e)). But this implies that h is log-spm
in (s,u) a.e.-C on B. Since supp [K( z ;uH)] $ supp [K( z ;uL)], this
implies that h is log-spm in (s,u) a.e.-C on D.
Extensions to Lemma 5. Part (i). Case (a) follows from
Lemma A1. Case (b): Consider the case where g crosses 0 (other-
wise, the expectation is always nonnegative) at s 5 s0, and k . 0;
218 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSthe other cases can be handled in a manner similar to the proof of
Lemma A1. Then, we extend (2) as follows:
















The inequality follows, as in Theorem 2, because g crosses
zero at s0 and [g(s;uH)k(s;uH)]/[g(s;uL)k(s;uL)] is nonnegative and
nondecreasing. Part (ii): Sufﬁciency follows from Lemma A2. Ne-
cessity of (A) follows from Lemma 5. Necessity of (B) follows by
Lemma A2, since once the properties of Lemma A2 are estab-
lished, the proof of Lemma 5 applies. Part (iii) follows from
Lemma A1.
Proof of Proposition 3. (A) and (B) imply (C): if p is differen-
tiable in x and B is a convex set, we can analyze whether
*u9(p(x,s))px(x,s)f(s;u) dm(s) satisﬁes SC1. We can let g 5 px, and
let k 5 u1f, and apply Theorem 2. Now consider the investor’s
choice between two values of x, xH . xL. Deﬁne g(s,u) [
u(p(xH,s),u) 2 u(p(xL,s),u), and let k(s;u) [ f(s;u). First, observe
that SC2 is preserved under monotone transformations, so that if
u is nondecreasing in its ﬁrst argument, then by (A), u(p(x,s),u)
must satisfy SC2 in (x;s), and g(s,u) satisﬁes SC1 in s. Let s0 be the
crossing point of g( z , u). First restrict attention to s $ s0, where
p(xH,s) $ p(xL,s). Deﬁne h(a,b,u) [* y5a
b u1(y,u) dy, and note that
h is log-spm in (a,b,u) for all a , b, by Lemmas 2 and 3 and (B).
This in turn implies that g(s,u) 5 h(p(xL,s),p(xH,s),u) is log-spm in
(s,u)o ns $ s0 since p is nondecreasing in s, and thus g(s;uH)/
g(s;uL) is nondecreasing in s on s $ s0. On the other hand, if s ,
s0, p(xH,s) # p(xL,s), and g(s,u) 52 h(p(xL,s),p(xH,s),u). Then,
g(s;uH)/g(s;uL) is nondecreasing in s on s , s0 since h is log-spm,
and we apply extension (i) of Lemma 5.
219 MONOTONE COMPARATIVE STATICSNecessity follows by Theorem 2 for the case where p is
differentiable; the proof is omitted for the more general case.
Proof of Lemma 7. Consider sufﬁciency ﬁrst. The argument
is easiest to see when g is absolutely continuous with lim
s3sup S
g(s) 5
g #, so that integration by parts may be used. We also work back-
wards in establishing the single-crossing property: we show that
G(uH) # (,) 0 implies that G(uL) # (,) 0. To proceed, observe that
G(uH) # 0 if and only if
g # 2E g9~s!K~s;uH! ds # 0,
which requires 2* g9(s)K(s;uH) ds # 0 since g is single crossing.
But, quasi concavity of g implies that 2g9 is SC1. Thus, equation
(2) can be applied, letting 2g9 play the role of g, K play the role of
k, so that, if we deﬁne L(s) [ K(s;uH)/K(s;uL), we have
2E g9~s!K~s;uH! ds $ 2L~s0!E g9~s!K~s;uL! ds.
Now, since K is a probability distribution, if L[ is nondecreasing,
it must always be less than one. Thus, if 2* g9(s)K(s;uH) ds # 0,
then 2* g9(s)K(s;uH) ds $ 2* g9(s)K(s;uL) ds. But then,
G~uL! 5 g # 2E g9~s!K~s;uL! ds
# g # 2E g9~s!K~s;uH! ds
5 G~uH!,
and we have established that G(uH) # (,) 0 implies G(uL) # (,)
0. Now consider necessity. Suppose that K is not log-supermodu-
lar. Then, there exists an open interval (s0,s0 1e ) such that
(K(s0 1e ;u) 2 K(s0;u))/K(s0;u) is decreasing in u. Then, let g(s;d)b e
deﬁned as follows:
g~s;d! 5H
21 s [ ~2`,s0#
K~s0;uL! 2 d~1 2 K~s0 1 e;uL!!
K~s0 1 e;uL! 2 K~s0;uL!
s [ ~s0,s0 1 e# Hd s [ ~s0 1 e,`!
so that G(uL) 5 0, while for d sufﬁciently small, G(uH) , 0.
220 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSProof of Lemma 8. (i): Under the assumptions of the theo-
rem, v(x,y,s) satisﬁes (SM) if and only if u(x,s;b) [ v(x,b(x),s) has
SC2 in (x;s) for all functions b. Furthermore, V(x,y,u) satisﬁes
(SM) if and only if U(x,u;b) [ V(x,b(x),u) has SC2 in (x;u) for all
functions b. So, if we know that v(x,y,s) satisﬁes (SM), then
u(x,s;b) has SC2 in (x;s) for all functions b. If k is log-spm a.e.-m,
then Theorem 2 implies that U(x,u;b) has SC2 in (x;s) for all
functions b. But this in turn implies that V(x,y,u) satisﬁes (SM).
(ii): Consider any f :S3Q3 R1. Let F(s;u) 5* 2`
s f(t;u) dm(t).
The working paper [Athey 1996] shows that if F( z ;u)i sn o t
ordered by (MLR), then there exists a continuous g which satisﬁes
SC1 so that * g(s) dF(s;u) fails SC1 (this is a continuous approxi-
mation to the test functions from Lemma 6). Consider this func-
tion g. We know that, since g is continuous and crosses zero only
once, it must be monotone nondecreasing in some neighborhood of
the crossing point/region. Now, deﬁne the following points, which
are the boundaries of the region, where g(s) 5 0: c 5 infs[R {s:
g(s) 5 0}, d 5 sups[R {s: g(s) 5 0}. Now, we can ﬁnd a d.0 and
two corresponding points, cd [ sups,c {sug(s) 52 d } and dd [ infs.d
{sug(s) 5d }, such that (c,d) , (cd,dd) and g is nondecreasing on
(cd,dd). Let us deﬁne a new function, a(s), as follows: a(s) 5dfor
s [ (cd,dd), a(s) 5 ug(s)u elsewhere. Now, pick any xH . xL, and let
v(x,y,s) 5 x z g(s)/(xH 2 xL) 1a (s) z y. Since a(s) and g(s) are




]y 5 g~s!/~~xH 2 xL! z a~s!!
is nondecreasing in s. Thus, v satisﬁes the assumptions of the
theorem as well as (SM). Now, * v(x,y,s) dF(s;u) satisﬁes (SM) if
and only if * v(x,b(x),s) dF(s;u) satisﬁes SC2 in (x;u) for all b. Let
b(x) 5 0. But, v(xH,0,s) 2 v(xL,0,s) 5 g(s), and by construction
* g(s) dF(s;u) fails SC1, which in turn implies that * v(x,0,s)
dF(s;u) fails SC2 in (x;u). Thus, * v(x,y,s) dF(s;u) fails (SM).
(iii): If v(x,y,s) fails the (SM), then there exists a b(x) such
that v(x,b(x),s) fails SC2 in (x;s). But then, Theorem 2 implies
that there exists an f(s;u) which is log-spm a.e.-m such that
* v(x,b(x),s)f(s;u) dm(s) fails SC2 in (x;u). We conclude that
* v(x,y,s)f(s;u) dm(s) fails (SM).
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